The court`s cumbersome approach to a reasonable probability of a result other than the materiality of Brady suggests several things. First, while reasonable possibility or probability, Kotteakos` standard and reasonable probability express different levels of confidence in the hypothetical impact of errors on decision-makers` reasoning, the differences between the standards are small. Second, the gap between the three formulations is greater than the differences between them. Third, because of this larger discrepancy in Brady, it is misleading to use the term probability, which is naturally interpreted as related to probable and thus confused with more probable than unlikely, see Morris v. Mathews, 475 U.S. 237, 247 (1986) (apparently treating reasonable probability as synonymous with probable); Id., p. 254, n. 3 (Blackmun, J., agreeing with the judgment) (cautions against confusing reasonable probability with higher-than-unlikely probability). We`d better talk about an important possibility of a different result to characterize the Brady materiality standard.
Even then, given the flexibility of all these sentences,3 the touchstone of the investigation must remain whether the suppression of evidence undermines our confidence that the investigator would have reached the same conclusion. Even taking into account these reservations as to the appropriate degree of materiality, the application of the test to the facts of the case does not give the Court easy answers, as it freely acknowledges. See ante, page 26. Indeed, the court acknowledges that discrediting Stoltzfuss` testimony could have changed the outcome of the trial at age 27, and that the district court was certainly correct in concluding that a reasonable possibility that a complete or only substantial deduction from Stoltzfus` testimony would have led to a different result, either in the guilt phase. or in the punitive phase. ante, at page 2829. Before I get to the bias analysis, I should say a few words about the standard for its identification and the unfortunate wording of the summary in which the standard is usually formulated. The Court speaks to the well-known and perhaps familiar misleading wording: is there a sufficient likelihood of a different outcome if the undisclosed evidence had been disclosed. The Court correctly points out that the standard of these terms does not require defendants to prove that a different outcome would have been more likely than not with the evidence suppressed, much less that, without the undisclosed evidence, the evidence would not have been sufficient to support the result. See ante, p.
27; Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434435 (1995). Instead, the Court again asks (as I have done elsewhere) whether the favourable evidence could reasonably be accepted in order to present the whole case in such a different light that confidence in the outcome would be shaken. Ante, p. 27 (cited by Kyles, op. cit., p. 435).
Subscribe to America`s largest dictionary and get thousands of other definitions and an advanced search – ad-free! 3. Each of these expressions or standards has been used in a number of contexts. For example, the Court has availed itself of a reasonable opportunity to determine the degree of risk of harm to competition necessary to bring an action under the Robinson-Patman Act, see, for example, Brooke Group Ltd. v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222 (1993); the standard for assessing whether a grand jury subpoena under section (c) of the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure should be revoked, see United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292 (301) (1991); and the burden on the debtor in proving that certain security rights are necessary for reorganization and are therefore exempt from the automatic stay provision of insolvency laws (see United Sav.
Assn. of Tex v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 375376 (1988). We found this in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946) to determine the safety of unconstitutional errors in direct review as a criterion for the investigation of the clearance of constitutional errors in collateral review. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.
619, 637638 (1993). We have defined with sufficient probability the burden on the plaintiff to bring a claim under section 7 of the Clayton Act, see, for example, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962); FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 5561 (1948) (Jackson, J., partially different) (comparison of reasonable possibility and reasonable probability and reasoning of the latter as an appropriate standard under the Robinson-Patman Act); the standard for the issuance of certiorari, cancellation and referral in the light of developments, see, for example, Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S.
163, 167 (1996) (per curiam); and the standard for exempting organizations from otherwise valid disclosure obligations in the event of threats or harassment arising from disclosure, see, for example, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam). We have recently used important opportunities to explain the circumstances in which nominal compensation is equitable compensation in a lawsuit under the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, see Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 123 (1997), but we use this term most often to define one of the conditions for granting suspended residency bis certiorari. The three-part test requires a reasonable likelihood that the court will establish a certiorari or probable jurisdiction, a substantial possibility that the court will set aside the next decision, and the likelihood of irreparable harm without suspension.
See, for example, Barfuß v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 895 (1983); Packwood v. Senate Select Comm. on Ethics, 510 U.S. 1319 (1994) (Rehnquist, J.C., in chamber). Although the Fourth Amendment states that “no warrant shall be issued, but for probable cause,” it does not specify what “probable cause” actually means. The Supreme Court has repeatedly attempted to clarify the meaning of the term, recognizing that probable cause is an imprecise, fluid and highly contextual concept. In Illinois v.
Gates favored a flexible approach to the court, viewing probable cause as a “practical, not technical” standard that invoked the “factual and practical considerations of everyday life that reasonable and prudent persons . 1 Courts often take a broader and more flexible view of probable cause when the alleged offences are serious. I view this case in the same way as the Court, beginning with its view in Part III (which I support) that Strickler was correct in apologizing for the procedural error in his Brady trial. Like the court, I find it clear that the documents withheld were devastating munitions for the removal of Stoltzfus.1 See ante, page 19. Even on the issue of bias or materiality,2 on which I ultimately share the majority, I am satisfied that Strickler has not demonstrated a sufficient probability that, had the undisclosed documents been disclosed, he would not have been convicted of murder punishable by death.
