Non-proliferation and counter-proliferation are general topics that include, inter alia, elements of international law (e.g. non-proliferation treaties), scientific and technical fields (e.g. physics, biochemistry and engineering involved in the development of weapons of mass destruction) and political science (e.g. , the motives of political leaders for pursuing weapons of mass destruction). Academic courses and training on non-proliferation and counter-proliferation often come from different fields. Therefore, even within national security-oriented institutions (such as military academies), there are no standard textbooks for these subjects. However, a number of general overviews have become standard references within academic and analytical circles, focusing on proliferation issues. Larsen and Smith 2005 presents a historical overview, a dictionary of terms, and a specialized bibliography designed to quickly guide novice academics and professional researchers in the fields of proliferation and arms control. Carus 2012 analyses an ongoing challenge that continues to complicate the academic and political assessment of non-proliferation and counter-proliferation issues of weapons of mass destruction: different definitions – including those of international and national law – of weapons of mass destruction.
This study is an updated edition of a comprehensive 2006 research project on the origins and use of various international treaties and U.S. legal definitions of weapons of mass destruction. Cirincione, et al. The year 2005 provides a compendium of global WMD programmes and has served as an important reference text for numerous academic studies and analyses carried out by research institutes on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the early 21st century. Many policy and academic analyses of proliferation issues focus on whether it is possible to predict (or improve predictability) whether other actors will develop or acquire nuclear weapons in the future. Potter and Mukhatzhanova 2010 is an anthology whose twelve government case studies together provide a detailed picture for novice researchers or analysts on the key factors – and actors – to be considered in proliferation assessments. Pilat and Kirchner 1995 present good definitions of non-proliferation and counter-proliferation (and the relationship between the two) while describing the main concepts and policies associated with the latter. Ogilvie-White 1996 and Hymans 2006 present critical debate reviews in academic studies on nonproliferation, which serve as good introductions and insights into theoretical approaches to the subject. The study provides a detailed assessment of issues related to different definitions of the term (including different legal definitions in U.S. domestic and state law). The paper argues for the use of a 1948 definition developed by the United Nations and used in subsequent arms control and non-proliferation treaties.
In the academic and policy literature on international relations and national security issues, proliferation is generally understood to refer to the proliferation or increase of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – a term commonly used to refer to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) munitions and their means of delivery (for an in-depth study of definitions of weapons of mass destruction, see Carus 2012, cited in the General Overviews section). The actual or potential proliferation of such weapons – which, even in relatively small numbers, can cause many casualties, social disruption and, in the case of nuclear weapons, widespread material destruction – has long posed a significant threat to international peace and security. In this context, non-proliferation broadly refers to the means and methods of preventing the acquisition, transfer, discovery or development of materials, technologies, knowledge, ammunition/devices or means of delivery related to weapons of mass destruction. Counter-proliferation is a distinct but closely related term; These are efforts and initiatives aimed at (1) directly preventing, suppressing or eliminating efforts to proliferate weapons of mass destruction and (2) preventing an actor armed with weapons of mass destruction from profiting from the possession or use of such weapons. These terms are also often used to discuss states that halt or dismantle their weapons of mass destruction programs, a process Perkovich called “non-proliferation” in 1999 (cited among states outside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons). Neither this term nor other proposed terms for this phenomenon have been widely used, but it is generally accepted that it includes non-proliferation and counter-proliferation elements (e.g. a state dismantles a secret WMD program to avoid the risk of detection and sanctions), and the relevant literature is covered in this article. The magnitude of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction has led to a number of multilateral efforts within the international system to prevent their proliferation, such as the negotiation of legally binding treaties and the establishment of institutional mechanisms for compliance. This “international non-proliferation regime” includes the 1967 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention. In general, counter-proliferation efforts remain rather ad hoc and involve fewer states, although the level of cooperation has increased significantly in the early 21st century, mainly due to U.S.
initiatives. These differences in the depth, breadth and duration associated with non-proliferation and counter-proliferation initiatives for weapons of mass destruction are reflected in the existing literature on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; Studies on nonproliferation issues far exceed those focused on counter-proliferation, although the latter area has received increased scientific attention in the United States and abroad. Joseph F. Pilat, and Walter L. Kirchner. “The technological promise of counter-proliferation.” Washington Quarterly 18.1 (1995): 153-166. It teaches you to take your time, or as the Germans call it, it gives you “rest”, the great condition sine qua non!. Yes, while states like Iran and North Korea certainly pose a challenge to the international community – whether in terms of a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or a threat to regional stability – experts argue that engagement should trump confrontation. Although international sanctions against Iran`s nuclear program have recently been extended, as calls for preemptive military strikes against Iran`s nuclear facilities mount, Tehran remains determined. In this context, talks will resume in February 2013 following recent delays. Similarly, North Korea has retained its nuclear arsenal despite ongoing sanctions and international isolation. On the other hand, proponents of engagement [PDF] argue that the negotiations produced concrete results by examining the nuclear ambitions of both countries.
Overall, proponents of the commitment argue that more coercive measures would not only prevent the United States and the international community from reaching a compromise with those states, but would also unbalance regional stability and facilitate nuclear proliferation.
